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What is consciousness?
Consciousness continues to be an ill-
defined concept, so I shall start by discuss-
ing how the term is used in this special issue. 
As discussed in Overgaard and Overgaard 
(2010), there is an important distinction 
between level of consciousness and con-
tent of consciousness. Level of conscious-
ness refers to a dimension that varies from 
coma at one extreme, through sleep and, 
at the other extreme, alert wakefulness. 
Philosophers call this creature conscious-
ness since it applies to the whole creature 
(Rosenthal, 2009). Level of consciousness 
is of particular relevance to the studies of 
patients in persistent vegetative state dis-
cussed by Laureys and colleagues (Demertzi 
et al., 2011). However, most of the contribu-
tions to this special issue are concerned with 
the content of consciousness.
Alert wakefulness is characterized by 
consciousness of specific mental states. The 
states that we are aware of are the contents 
of consciousness. Philosophers call this state 
consciousness. This is somewhat confusing, 
given that, when people talk about altered 
states of consciousness, they are usually 
referring to different levels of consciousness 
rather than different contents of conscious-
ness. So I will continue to use the terms level 
and contents of consciousness.
In studies of the neural correlates of 
consciousness there is great interest in con-
trasting the neural activity associated with 
stimuli that influence the contents of con-
sciousness with the neural activity associ-
ated with the same stimuli when they affect 
behavior in the absence of any change in the 
content of consciousness (Frith et al., 1999). 
When a stimulus elicits neural activity and 
affects behavior it does not necessarily fol-
low that we are aware of that stimulus.
A certain minimal level of consciousness 
is necessary for there to be any contents of 
consciousness, but the level of conscious-
ness does not determine what the contents 
of consciousness will be. As is demonstrated 
in this special issue, brain plasticity has an 
important role in determining the contents 
of consciousness.
There is also a reflective aspect of con-
sciousness which is modeled by Cleeremans 
(2011) and which Allen and Williams 
(2011) suggest may be uniquely human. 
Are conscious mental states thoughts about 
thoughts? Is consciousness by its very nature 
reflective? There is clearly a relationship 
between this aspect of consciousness and 
metacognition. I shall return to considera-
tion of this relationship at the end of this 
introduction.
certain neural structures are 
necessary, but not sufficient for 
consciousness
It is well established that brain lesions can alter 
the contents of consciousness. To take just 
one example, lesions to the extra-striate cor-
tex can eliminate awareness of color (achro-
matopsia, Zeki, 1990). Brain stimulation can 
also generate the contents of consciousness. 
For example, electrical stimulation of extra-
striate cortex can generate hallucinations 
of various visual features including color 
(Lee et al., 2000). This has lead to the idea 
of essential nodes for the specific conscious 
contents (e.g., V4 for color, Zeki and Bartels, 
1999). In accord with this idea, Silvanto and 
Rees (2011) conclude that, in the absence of 
primary visual cortex, humans seem to have 
extremely limited capacity for visual aware-
ness (but see Ffytche and Zeki, 2011).
However, these essential nodes are clearly 
not sufficient for consciousness. If the level 
of consciousness is too low, as in coma, then 
experience does not occur even though the 
essential nodes are intact. Laureys and col-
leagues (Demertzi et al., 2011) suggest that 
the lack of awareness in such cases is due 
to the loss of certain kinds of long-range 
connectivity in the brain. Similar effects 
may be produced by anesthesia in which 
long-ranged connectivity is lost temporarily 
(Alkire et al., 2008).
brain plasticity provides 
important clues for 
understanding the nature of 
consciousness and its relation 
to the brain
The theme of this special issue is the obser-
vation that the loss of awareness associated 
with brain damage is frequently reversed. 
Unilateral spatial neglect, for example, is a 
disorder of consciousness associated with 
stroke from which recovery can be quite 
rapid (Cappa and Perani, 2010). In some 
cases it may be that brain tissue has been 
temporarily been deactivated, and subse-
quently recovers. However, in the many 
cases where brain tissue has been perma-
nently damaged, we have to ask how such 
recovery is possible. The doctrine of essen-
tial nodes would suggest that, if the node 
has been destroyed, recovery should not be 
possible.
Mogensen (2011) presents an excellent 
discussion of this problem. Does recovery 
depend upon the growth of new connec-
tions? Does the patient develop new cogni-
tive strategies? One important conclusion is 
that the brain activity supporting recovery 
need not be in the same location as that 
originally supporting the experience. This 
observation supports two conclusions: (1) 
Conscious experience (qualia) can be re-
acquired through some sort of learning 
process. (2) The nature of the experience 
(qualia) is not solely determined by the 
nature/location of the brain activity sup-
porting it. This second conclusion is dra-
matically illustrated in the studies from 
Kupers et al. (2011) in which congenitally 
blind subjects were trained to “see” using a 
tactile stimulator. This technique involves 
turning the 2D images picked up by a video 
camera into a corresponding pattern of 2D 
tactile stimulation applied to the tongue. 
After being trained to recognize simple 
patterns with this stimulator, brain imag-
ing revealed that performance of the task 
elicited activity in visual cortex. In addition 
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Probably the most striking success 
in comparing qualia across people is 
Bartoshuk’s et al. (2004) demonstration of 
the existence of supertasters. These are peo-
ple who experience the sense of taste with a 
far greater intensity than average. This dis-
covery depended upon the development of 
scales for subjective experience that do not 
eliminate individual differences. There is 
still much work to be done in developing 
scales for quantifying subjective experience 
(see, for example, Sandberg et al., 2010), but 
it is clearly possible for such comparisons 
to be made.
hoW can We learn neW qualia?
Outside the laboratory human beings spend 
a lot of time in discussing their experiences. 
We enjoy telling each other what something 
was like. When we share experiences with 
others in this way, we can learn about two 
kinds of things. We can learn that other 
people have different experiences from 
ourselves. However, by pooling our experi-
ences we can also get a better estimate of 
that the world is like, since, most of the time, 
two heads are better than one (Bahrami 
et al., 2010).
In order to pool our experiences we need 
to down play our differences and take the 
best features from each experience. Since 
successful joint action (as well as joint per-
ception) depends upon such pooling, this 
may be why we are so often unaware of sub-
tle, but consistent differences in experience. 
The implication is that, as a result of shar-
ing experiences, our qualia may shift toward 
that of the person we are sharing with. I 
predict that the greatest shift will occur in 
the least expert member of the group. So 
I find most plausible the suggestion from 
Allen and Williams (2011), that we learn 
new qualia by interacting with others. This 
seems to be the case, for example, with 
activities like wine tasting (Smith, 2007). 
But for sharing our experiences we have 
to introspect upon and communicate our 
experience. This requirement emphasizes 
the reflective aspect of consciousness that 
is probably uniquely human. Reflecting 
upon our own experience is an example 
of metacognition, that is thinking about 
our thoughts.
There are considerable advantages for 
concentrating on this aspect of conscious-
ness since metacognition is more precisely 
defined. Furthermore powerful techniques 
But the potential for awareness can also 
be artificially modified. Genetic manipula-
tion in both mice and monkeys can alter 
the perception of color. Male squirrel mon-
keys are normally dichromats, but, even 
as adults, can be turned into trichromats 
through insertion of the missing opsin gene 
(Mancuso et al., 2009).
but hoW do We compare qualia?
The observation that new qualia can be 
acquired, whether through learning or gene 
therapy, reminds us of a fundamental prob-
lem in consciousness research. How can we 
compare qualia from one person to another? 
Or within the same person at different times? 
As Overgaard and Mogensen (2011) ask, when 
a brain damaged patient recovers an aware-
ness that had been lost, how can we know 
whether it is the same as the awareness that 
was present before the brain damage? If this 
recovered awareness is instantiated by activity 
in a different brain region and depends upon 
a different cognitive strategy it might well be 
different. Are there methods for determining 
whether two seemingly identical conscious 
states are actually different?
We have long known that people do have 
different sensory experiences. An obvious 
example is color blindness. The presence of 
the receptors necessary for color vision is 
under genetic control and some people have 
only two receptors instead of three, lead-
ing to different forms of color blindness 
(dichromacy), depending on which particu-
lar pigment is missing. The visual qualia of 
the color blind is clearly different, but tri-
chromats still have some idea of what color 
blindness is like. It has now been found that 
some women have more than three retinal 
photopigment genes. These women also 
perceive significantly more color appear-
ances than men or women with the usual 
three photopigment genes (Jameson et al., 
2001). In this case the discovery of the bio-
logical difference led to the identification 
of the difference in the experience of color 
that can be explored empirically by asking 
subjects to make fine color discriminations.
Another example concerns individual 
differences in the spatial extent of primary 
visual cortex (V1). People with larger 
V1 are more susceptible to size illusions 
(Schwarzkopf et al., 2011). Having iden-
tified this biological difference we now 
explore the idea that these people have a 
subtly different experience of space.
transcranial magnetic stimulation applied 
to visual cortex lead to the experience tac-
tile qualia. This is evidence against the idea, 
know as cortical dominance (Hurley and 
Noë, 2003), that qualia are determined 
by the cortical location of the associated 
brain activity. But what then is the prop-
erty of nervous activity that determines 
the difference in the experience of the 
different senses?
neW qualia can be learned
However, it is not only after brain dam-
age that qualia can be relearned and even 
learned for the first time. There are many 
examples of learning in the normal case. 
For example, between 6 and 12 months 
infants lose awareness of speech sound 
distinctions not present in their native lan-
guage. With sufficiently early intervention 
this loss of awareness can be reversed, but 
interestingly only through direct interac-
tion with a speaker, rather than passive 
exposure to audio or video-tapes (Kuhl 
et al., 2003).
Normal subjects can also learn to become 
conscious of stimuli previously outside 
awareness. Schwiedrzik et al. (2009) used 
meta-contrast masking to achieve chance 
performance in the detection of stimuli. 
After 5 days of training sensitivity was sig-
nificantly increased and subjects reported 
awareness of the stimuli. Gottfried and his 
colleagues (Li et al., 2008) exposed volun-
teers to odor molecules (rose oxide and 
2-butanol) that exist in two mirror image 
forms (enantiomers). At the beginning 
of the experiment the participants were 
entirely unable to smell any differences 
between the two mirror image forms, as is 
the case for most people. After only seven 
trials (for each odor) of standard Pavlovian 
conditioning, participants exhibited fear 
responses to the odor associated with shock 
and not to the other form, indicating that 
they now could distinguish between the 
mirror image odors. A further percep-
tual experiment showed that participants 
could now consciously detect the difference 
in smell.
In these examples, it seems likely that the 
potential to make perceptual distinctions 
was already present in the brain and that 
training revealed and enhanced this ability. 
For example, given the nature of the human 
eye we would not expect training to lead to 
awareness of infrared or ultraviolet light.
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are now available for the quantification of 
metacognition (e.g., Galvin et al., 2003) and 
such measures have been applied to show 
that disruption of activity in dorsolateral 
prefrontal can change meta-cognitive sen-
sitivity without altering discrimination per-
formance (Rounis et al., 2010). Cleeremans 
(2011) uses the concept of metacognition 
to develop a computational model of how 
a brain can learn to be conscious by con-
structing a theory of its own behavior.
For me, a particularly interesting idea for 
further exploration is that this process of 
learning to be conscious of new things (i.e., 
to acquire new qualia) critically depends 
upon social interactions. In the various 
examples I mentioned above the learning 
of new qualia depended upon feedback 
from a teacher. To learn to experience the 
difference between the mirror image smell 
molecules required the experimenter to sig-
nal the distinction. More particularly, the 
American babies only learned to make the 
distinctions involved in Mandarin Chinese 
phonology through direct interaction with 
a speaker (Kuhl et al., 2003).
conclusion
This special issue on the relevance of brain 
plasticity to the understanding of conscious-
ness reminds us that consciousness, and the 
qualia that make up that consciousness, are 
not static. The contents of consciousness are 
constantly changing and developing through 
our experiences and especially through our 
sharing of experiences with others. Such 
change and development does not cease after 
brain damage. Indeed it is the dynamic rela-
tionship between brain and consciousness 
that enables the recovery of lost experience.
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